STIGNING

Institutional Doctrine

Engineering Philosophy

STIGNING operates through explicit doctrine that governs architecture, security, infrastructure reliability, and long-term maintainability under adversarial conditions.

Engineering Doctrine

Architecture decisions are traced to explicit constraints, threat models, and operational responsibilities. Correctness and recoverability precede implementation velocity.

  • Specify constraints before selecting technologies.
  • Treat operational failure states as first-class design inputs.
  • Document invariants and architectural assumptions for long-term stewardship.

Security Doctrine

Security is designed as a system property across identity, protocol behavior, runtime controls, and deployment workflows. Checklist compliance is considered necessary but insufficient.

  • Assume hostile conditions and persistent attacker capability.
  • Minimize trust boundaries and privilege scope.
  • Enforce cryptographic discipline across key lifecycle and transport layers.

Infrastructure Doctrine

Infrastructure design emphasizes deterministic behavior under partial failure, degraded networks, and operational pressure. Resilience is integrated at architecture level.

  • Design for partition tolerance, dependency failure, and controlled degradation.
  • Engineer observability that supports diagnosis and rapid containment.
  • Validate operational controls under realistic fault conditions.

Longevity Doctrine

Infrastructure is expected to operate and evolve across multi-year cycles. Maintainability, migration strategy, and explicit interfaces are engineered from the start.

  • Prioritize architectures with clear upgrade and rollback paths.
  • Avoid dependency decisions that create unbounded operational lock-in.
  • Maintain documentation that supports transfer across teams and time horizons.

Adversarial Mindset

System validation is performed against credible abuse models including protocol misuse, supply-chain compromise, insider risk, and economic attack incentives.

  • Model attacker behavior as adaptive and persistent.
  • Test controls for bypass behavior, not only policy intent.
  • Track residual risk explicitly when constraints prevent full mitigation.